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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
CLIFTON YAZZIE, : Case No. 200400285CA 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from his convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol with 
two prior convictions, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41 -6-44(2)(a) 
& (6)(a) (West 2004); operating a motor vehicle without operator's security, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-302 (West 2004); and driving on 
a suspended or revoked operator's license, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH 
CODEANN. § 53-3-227(1) (West2004). This Court hasjurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the officer reasonably suspect that defendant was driving illegally based on the 
officer's knowledge that in well over one hundred previous encounters, spanning some 
twenty years, defendant never produced a driver's license when asked for identification? 
The denial of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. The 
trial court's factual findings are reviewed only for clear error. Its legal conclusions are 
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, fflf 12& 15, 512 
Utah Adv. Rep. 49. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is determinative of this 
appeal and is attached in Addendum A, together with other cited provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI), driving without 
security (no insurance), and driving on a suspended driver's license (R. 1-3). Prior to trial, 
he moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the stop of his vehicle was not justified 
by reasonable suspicion (R. 18-19). The court heard evidence and orally denied the motion 
(R58: 9-10,22-29). See Addendum B (Argument and Oral Ruling). Defendant then entered 
guilty pleas to the charged offenses, but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion 
to suppress (R. 39-45; R58: 31-34). 
On March 30,2004, defendant was sentenced to concurrent statutory terms of zero-to-
five years imprisonment (DUI), six months imprisonment (no insurance), and ninety days 
imprisonment (suspended license). On April 7, 2004, defendant timely appealed (R. 52). 
Defendant was subsequently released from custody pending appeal. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Mike Halliday was the chief of police for Blanding, Utah (R58: 5). He was a life-long 
resident of the small town and had been one of its police officers for twenty-nine years (R58: 
5, 10). He knew defendant for at least twenty of those years (R58: 6). The chief or other 
officers in his department had stopped or arrested defendant "well over a hundred" times 
(R58: 8-9). The majority of police encounters were alcohol-related—public intoxication and 
disorderly conduct (R58: 9). The chief knew of none involving driving (R58: 14-15). 
During each of these prior encounters, defendant was asked for identification (R58: 
6-7, 17). To Chief Halliday's knowledge, defendant never produced a driver's license as 
identification (R58: 6-7, 16-17). The last time the chief personally asked defendant for 
identification was approximately one year prior to the current offense (R5 8: 16). As before, 
defendant did not produce a license as identification (R58: 6-7, 16-17).2 
Defendant was a Utah resident (R58: 6, 10, 28). The chief had been to defendant's 
home in White Mesa, Utah, and knew that defendant always gave this address when he was 
booked into jail (R58: 10-11). During the twenty years the chief had known defendant, he 
1
 The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. See 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
2
 Defendant states only that the chief and defendant had "several" encounters. See 
Brief of Appellant [BrAplt.] at 4 & 13. The marshaled evidence establishes a much more 
extensive relationship. The chief personally asked defendant for identification 
"numerous" times "in excess often" and participated in or was aware of "well over a 
hundred" other police encounters involving as request for identification of defendant 
(R58: 8-9, 16-17). 
3 
had never seen defendant drive a vehicle (R58: 15). Based on his knowledge of defendant, 
the chief did not believe he was licensed to drive in Utah (R58: 7-8, 15). 
On October 15,2003, Chief Halliday was driving in Blanding when he saw defendant 
driving a vehicle (R58: 7). The officer was shocked. "Ah, the first thing that I thought of 
is that [defendant] did not - did not have a driver's license. I would have bet anything that 
he had no driver's license" (R58: 7). The chief attempted to pull defendant over, but by the 
time the vehicles stopped, defendant had traveled four blocks (R58: 7, 12).3 The chief 
observed no other traffic violations before stopping defendant (R58: 8). 
The chief asked defendant for a driver's license (R58: 19). Defendant produced an 
Arizona license (id.). Contemporaneously, the chief smelled alcohol on defendant and 
observed other signs of intoxication (id.). The chief called dispatch to determine the validity 
of the Arizona license, but was more concerned with the DUI and asked dispatch to contact 
Officer Mike Bradford to conduct field sobriety tests on defendant (R58: 20). 
When contacted, Officer Bradford also asked dispatch to determine defendant's 
license status (R57: 6-8, 10). After Bradford arrived at the scene, dispatch verified that 
defendant's Arizona license was "valid," but that defendant also had an expired Colorado 
license and a suspended Utah license (R57: 8).4 Officer Bradford conducted the field 
3
 Defendant suggests that the chief followed defendant for four blocks before 
making the decision to pull him over {Br.Aplt. at 5-6). The marshaled evidence is 
otherwise. The chief testified that he immediately stops anyone he suspects of driving 
without a license. In this case, he attempted to do so, but the two cars traveled about four 
Blanding blocks before defendant actually stopped (R58: 7, 12-14). 
4
 The trial court found that the Arizona license, through facially valid, did not 
authorize defendant to drive in Utah because defendant, a Utah resident, had his Utah 
4 
sobriety tests, which defendant failed (R57: 7-8). Subsequent testing revealed that 
defendant's blood-alcohol was .22, almost three times the legal limit (R57: 8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment requires that an officer reasonably suspect a defendant of 
criminality before stopping him for questioning. In determining if reasonable suspicion 
exists, the reviewing court must consider the totality of the circumstances in a common sense 
practical manner. 
As the trial court noted, the totality of the circumstances in this case is unusual. 
Rarely does a police officer have a twenty year history involving well over one hundred 
encounters with the same defendant. Yet, here, it is undisputed that Chief Halliday did. 
Consequently, the chief could reasonably rely on his personal knowledge of defendant in 
objectively assessing defendant's current conduct. Though Chief Halliday's knowledge of 
defendant was unique, any person possessing this same knowledge would have reasonably 
reached the same conclusion as the chief: defendant was likely driving illegally. The stop 
was, therefore, permissible. 
driving privileges suspended as a result of DUI convictions in 1995 and 2001 (R. 1-3; 
R57: 11; R58: 28-29) (Add. B). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-225(2) (West 2004) 
(Add. A) (prohibiting a Utah resident, whose license is suspended, from driving in Utah 
under another jurisdiction's license until a new Utah license is issued). 
5 
ARGUMENT 
REASONABLE SUSPICION BASED ON TWENTY YEARS OF 
ENCOUNTERS WITH DEFENDANT JUSTIFIED THE STOP 
A police officer may not compel an individual to stop unless there exists a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the individual committed or is in the process of committing a crime. 
See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987); Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT 
App 55, Tffl 12-13, 998 P.2d 274. Reasonable suspicion is more than a "mere hunch" and 
requires some factual foundation. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) 
(citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417-18 (1981)). Nevertheless, "the likelihood 
of criminal activity need not raise to the [probability] level required for probable cause." Id. 
at 274 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27 (1968), and United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
1, 7 (1989)). Instead, reasonable suspicion occurs when, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, there exists a "substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred or 
is about to occur." 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.4(b), at 146 (3rd ed. 1996). 
See also Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273-74; Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. 
Reasonable suspicion is not negated by an equal "possibility of innocent conduct." 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274-75 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, and Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9). See 
also United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 (2d Cir. 1979) ("It must be rare indeed that 
an officer observes behavior consistent Only [sic] with guilt and incapable of innocent 
interpretation, [internal citations omitted] In such a situation, there would be far more than 
reasonable suspicion; indeed there would be more than grounds necessary to support a 
finding of probable cause.") Consequently, even when facts observed by the officer are 
6 
"ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation," the Fourth Amendment permits a 
limited detention to "resolve the ambiguity." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,125 (2000) 
(citing and interpreting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). See also State v. Waldner, 556 N.W.2d 681, 
684 (Wis. 1996) ("The law allows a police officer to make an investigatory stop based on 
observations of lawful conduct so long as the reasonable inferences drawn from the lawful 
conduct are that criminal activity is afoot."). 
Moreover, a reviewing court is precluded from individually assessing the facts known 
to the officer, but must view the totality of facts and reasonable inferences as a whole and in 
light of the officer's "own experience and specialized training." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274-75; 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8. Accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^  14,78 P.3d 590 (reiterating 
proper reasonableness analysis). 
Here, the trial court concluded that Chief Halliday reasonably suspected defendant 
was not validly licensed to drive because: 
1. The chief knew defendant for twenty years; 
2. The chief knew defendant was a Utah resident, had been to his Utah home, 
and was aware that he always claimed a Utah address when booked into jail; 
3. The chief had never seen defendant drive a motor vehicle; 
4. The normal practice of the Blanding Police Department is to ask for 
identification, preferably a driver's license, from every stopped individual; 
5. The chief participated in or was personally aware of well over one hundred 
police encounters (stops and arrests) of defendant by the local police; 
6. The chief personally asked defendant for identification numerous times in 
excess of 10, though the chief could not remember if he specifically used the 
term "driver's license" in asking for identification; 
7. The last time the chief asked defendant for identification was approximately 
one year prior to the present offense; 
8. During these one hundred plus encounters, including the encounter one year 
prior to this incident, defendant never produced a driver's license. 
(R58: 5-20, 28-29). See also Add. B. Below, defendant conceded that if the last encounter 
had been more recent, the facts could support reasonable suspicion (R5 8:24).5 But defendant 
argued that because the last encounter occurred approximately one year before the stop, the 
chiefs information was stale and should be disregarded (R58: 24-2 5).6 
The trial court properly rejected defendant's argument. The court agreed that the 
timing and frequency of the past encounters were factors to be considered, but concluded that 
5
 Defense counsel argued: "[P]erhaps had the officer stopped him, like in the last 
couple of week[s] of the last - certainly the day before or certainly five minutes before, 
and found out the Mr., ah, Yazzie didn't have a driver's license, than maybe he would 
have more of a - of an articulable suspicion" (R58: 24). 
6
 Defendant argued that if the prior knowledge were disregarded, the chief would 
have been obligated to contact dispatch to verify the license status before stopping 
defendant (R58: 24-25). See also Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 14-15, 18-19. If no 
reasonable suspicion existed, defendant is correct. However, if suspicion existed, then 
"[t]he reasonableness of an officer's decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the 
availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11 (other 
citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 
U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985) ("A creative judge engaged impost hoc evaluation of police 
conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by the objectives of the police 
might have been accomplished. But the fact that the protection of the public might, in the 
abstract, have been accomplished by less intrusive means does not, by itself, render the 
search unreasonable."); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1203-04 (Utah 1995) 
(recognizing that driving on a suspended license is a serious continuing offense, which 
justifies an immediate stop and arrest). Consequently, if the chief reasonably suspected 
defendant of driving illegally, an immediate stop was justified without seeking dispatch 
verification. If on the other hand, reasonable suspicion was lacking, the chief would have 
been required to contact dispatch to determine the license status before stopping 
defendant. As implied by the trial court, verification before the stop would have resulted 
in probable cause to arrest and not merely reasonable suspicion to stop (R58: 22). 
8 
here the unusual length (twenty years) and unusual number (well over one hundred), justified 
the officer's suspicions: 
Ah, the reason that I think that it was reasonable for the officer to stop is 
that it was such a long time that the defendant had never had a license. I think 
it's reasonable to - to believe he still doesn't have one, and he's driving now. 
But's there's a fairly strong argument the other way. You know, maybe he 
decided to go get a license, before he started drivin' [sic]. And in fact, he did. 
In this case it turned out he did. He got it from the wrong agency. It didn't do 
him any good. It was both wrong, because he wasn't a resident of Arizona, and 
because his license was - and even if it was a valid Arizona license, it was 
useless in Utah, because his privilege to drive in Utah was suspended. But he 
had — he had apparently decided he wanted to try to get a license. 
But I think it was reasonable for this officer to suspect that he did not have 
a license, that he was driving based on that long history and the frequent 
contact. 
This is an unusual case. I wouldn't ordinarily permit an officer to stop 
someone just because once before, somebody didn't have a license. But the 
number of times and the extended period of time, I think it was reasonable for 
just him just to assume that yeah, he still didn't have a license. 
(R58: 28-29) (Add. B). Cf. State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104,116 n.4,48 P.3d 872, cert, denied, 
535 U.S. 1062 (2002); State v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (both 
recognizing that the existence of an on-going activity refutes a staleness claim). 
On appeal, defendant expands his argument. Citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 
(Utah 1994), defendant claims for the first time that the chiefs prior knowledge of defendant 
could not be considered because it was based on a "mistaken assumption" that defendant was 
never licensed in any jurisdiction. See Br.Aplt. at 9,14,17-19, 23. Additionally, for the first 
time, defendant argues that a defendant's criminal history alone can never establish a 
reasonable suspicion (Br.Aplt. at 20). Because these arguments were not preserved, their 
merits should not be considered. See State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, ^  8, 86 P.3d 759 
9 
(reaffirming preservation/waiver rule). Even if the merits are considered, the arguments lack 
legal and factual support. 
Lopez does not control this case. In Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134-40, the supreme court 
addressed the pretext arrest doctrine and concluded that if justification existed for a stop, the 
stop was lawful under the Fourth Amendment regardless of the subjective motivation of the 
officer in stopping the suspect. Nevertheless, the court ultimately remanded to determine if, 
in fact, the claimed moving violation justified the stop. Id, at 1133-34. In doing so, the court 
agreed that the officer did not otherwise have reasonable suspicion to stop Lopez because 
even though the officer thought defendant had no license this was based on the officer's 
mistaken belief that Lopez was another individual (Jose Cruz). Id. at 1129-30. 
In this case, Chief Halliday was not mistaken as to defendant's identity or as to his 
lack of a valid license at the time of the stop. Contrary to defendant's assertion, Br.Aplt. at 
9, 14, 17-19, 23, the issue is not whether defendant ever had a Utah license, but whether he 
was driving illegally on October 15, 2003, when observed by Chief Halliday. As the trial 
court correctly found, defendant was not licensed to drive in Utah at the time of the stop 
(R58: 28-29) (Add. B). Why he was not licensed is irrelevant. That defendant had prior 
DUI's, had a Utah license at some unspecified prior point in time, had an expired Colorado 
license, or had, as the trial court termed it, a "useless" Arizona license did not change the fact 
that at the time of the stop, the chief correctly suspected that defendant was not licensed to 
10 
drive in Utah.7 
Nor is defendant correct that a knowledge of a defendant's criminal history may never 
be considered in determining reasonable suspicion. SeeBrAplt. at20. The trial court clearly 
rejected the notion that defendant's prior alcohol violations would alone justify the 
assumption that he was drunk while driving (R58: 9-10). Accord United States v. Sandoval, 
29 F.3d 537, 542-43 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the "mere fact" that a suspect has been 
previously arrested for a similar offense does not alone create reasonable suspicion). But the 
trial court properly considered the circumstances of the one hundred plus stops and arrests 
in determining the reasonableness of the chief s assumption that because defendant had never 
produced a driver's license before, it was likely he did not have one now (R58: 28-29). 
Accord id. at 542 (citing numerous cases where prior convictions have been considered, with 
other factors, in establishing reasonable suspicion); United States v. Feliciano, 45 F.3d 1070, 
1074 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that knowledge of prior criminal conduct is "of doubtful 
evidentiary value . . . [but] is a permissible component of articulable suspicion required for 
a Terry stop"). See also State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137 (Utah App. 1997) (upholding 
reliance on trustworthy information concerning Humphrey's past criminal involvement in 
assessing reasonable suspicion). 
7
 Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly considered the subsequent 
verification by dispatch in determining if reasonable suspicion existed (Br.Aplt. at 21). 
Defendant is incorrect. The trial court concluded that reasonable suspicion existed based 
on the chiefs knowledge at the time of the stop, to wit, that for twenty years and in over 
one hundred encounters, defendant never produced a license and was never seen driving 
(R58: 28-29). 
11 
In sum, Chief Halliday's knowledge—that for twenty years and in over one hundred 
encounters, defendant never produced a license and was never seen driving—supports a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving illegally on October 15, 2003. The stop, 
therefore, was justified and defendant's motion to suppress properly denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ o / d a y of December, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney Genera 
{^JjJiAidJnc 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellee were mailed to William L. Schultz, attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 69 
East Center, P.O. Box 937, Moab, UT 84532, this <^33a4ay of December, 2004. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
Amendment IV. Search and seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
§ 41—6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration—Measure-
ment of blood or breath alcohol—Criminal punishment—Arrest without 
warrant—Penalties—Suspension or revocation of license 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview with a licensed 
mental health therapist: 
(i) used to determine if a person is in need of: 
(A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse 
program; 
(B) an educational series; or 
(C) a combination of Subsections (l)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
in accordance with Section 62A-15-105. 
(b)(i) "conviction" means any~donviction for a violation of: 
(A) this section; 
(B) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driv-
ing under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(C) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled sub-
stance that is taken illegally in the body; 
(D) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43; 
(E) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; 
(F) Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g); 
(G) a violation described in Subsections (l)(b)(i)(A) through (F), which 
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(H) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States which 
would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state, 
including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(ii) A plea of guilty or no contest to a violation described in Subsections 
(l)(b)(i)(A) through (H) which plea is held in abeyance under Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the 
rcharge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the 
plea in abeyance agreement) for purposes of: 
(A) enhancement of penalties under: 
(I) this Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless 
Driving; and 
(II) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; and 
(B) expungement under Section 77-18-12. 
(c) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a sub-
stance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d)> "screening" means a preliminary appraisal of a person: 
(i) used to determine if the person is in need of: 
(A) an assessment; or 
(B) an educational series; and 
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(e) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
seri6u& permanent disfigurement protracted loss or impairment of the func-
tion of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance 
abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(g) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance 
abuse program; < > 
(h) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(i) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person 
Exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
ithin this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical 
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
,08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influ-
ence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle; or 
c (iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
at the time of operation or actual physical control; 
(iv)(A) is 21 years of age or older; 
- (B) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent 
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .05 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
operation or actual physical control; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction; or 
(v)(A) is 21 years of age or older; 
(B) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or 
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control; 
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
operation or actual physical cpntrol; and 
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been 
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of 
violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tions (2)(a)(i) through (iii) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result 
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of 
age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(c) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(iv) or (v) is guilty 
of: 
(i) a class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the person has also inflicted bodily injury 
upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a 
negligent manner. 
(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first convic-
tion, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require 
the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 48 
hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic moni-
toring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or 
home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening; 
(ii) order the person to participate, in an assessment, if it is found 
appropriate by a screening under Subsection (4)(c)(i); 
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court 
does not order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection 
(4)(d); and 
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if 
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse 
treatment is appropriate. 
(e)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order 
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol 
level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the person in 
accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5)(a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require 
the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240 
hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic moni-
toring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or 
xiome confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an assessment, if it is found 
appropriate by a screening under Subsection (5)(c)(i); 
(iii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court 
does not order substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection 
(5)(d); and 
(iv) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if 
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse 
treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if 
it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of 
two or more prior convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed 
after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1, 
2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of 
this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of 
a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of hot less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring 
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse 
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive care 
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after 
treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c)t if the 
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which 
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement through 
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may 
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a sentenc-
ing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a screening; an 
assessment, if appropriate; and an educational series; obtain, in the discretion 
of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse 
treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening, assess-
ment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in connection 
with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 
41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render in connection 
with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction 
requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b)(i) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to: 
(A) complete all court ordered: 
(I) screening; 
(II) assessment; 
(III) educational series; 
(IV) substance abuse treatment; and 
(V) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or 
(B) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment 
costs. 
(ii) Upon receiving the notification described in Subsection (8)(b)(i), the 
division shall suspend the person's driving privilege in accordance with 
Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3). 
(9)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute 
for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state 
for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant 
in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether 
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered 
under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction of 
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the peace officer has probable cause to believe the violation 
has occurred, although not in the peace officer's presence, and if the peace 
officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was committed by the 
person. 
(1 l)(a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for 
the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subse-
quent offense under Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior conviction 
as defined under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a 
period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court 
under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension 
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. 
(12)(a)(i) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 
180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those persons 
who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(ii) The additional suspension or revocation period provided in this 
Subsection (12) shall begin the date on which the individual would be 
eligible to reinstate the individual's driving privilege for a violation of 
Subsection (2). 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsec-
tion (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division 
an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified 
period of time. 
(13)(a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert 
the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement 
units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the 
person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be 
monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a 
substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the 
time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to 
attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel directly 
between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if 
the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be 
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation moni-
toring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by 
the court under Subsection (13)(d)(iv). 
(14)(a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or Sub-
section (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by 
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor 
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, condi-
tions of probation, and court orders received under this article and shall 
notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that sentence or 
those conditions or orders. 
(d)(i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with proba-
tion if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall cover 
the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is 
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of . 16 or higher, 
the court shall order the following, or describe on record why the order or 
orders are not appropriate: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d); and 
(b) one or both of the following: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of 
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
3 4l-l2a-3G2. Operating motor vefiic/e wft&out owner's or operator's 
security—Penalty 
(1) Any owner of ajmotor vehicle on which owner's or operator's security is 
required under Section 41-12a-301, who operates his vehicle or permits it to 
be operated on a highway in this state without owner's security being in effect 
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and the fine shall be not less than: 
(a) $400 for a first offense; and 
(b) $1,000 for a second and subsequent offense within three years of a 
previous conviction or bail forfeiture. 
(2)(a) Except as provided under Subsection (2)(b), any other person who 
operates a motor vehicle upon a highway in Ijtah with the knowledge that the 
owner does not have owner's security in effect for the motor vehicle is also 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and the fine shall be not less than: 
(i) $400 for a first offense; and 
(ii) $1,000 for a second and subsequeut offense within three years of a 
previous conviction or bail forfeiture. 
(b) A person that has in effect owner's seeurity on a Utah-registered motor 
vehicle or its equivalent that covers the operation, by the person, of the motqr 
vehicle in question is exempt from this Subsection (2). 
§ 5 3 - 3 - 2 2 5 . Eligibility for new license after revocation 
(l)(a) Except as provided in Subsections (b) and (c)/a fperslsn whose license 
has ^>een revoked under this chapter may not apply for fof receive any new 
license until the expiration of one year from the date the former license was 
rfevoked. 
(b) A person's license may be revoked for a longer 'period as provided in: 
(i) Section 53-3-220, for driving a motor vehicle while the person's 
license is revoked, or involvement as a driver in an accident or violation of 
the motor vehicle laws; and 
(ii) Section 53-3-221, for failing to comply with the terms of a traffic 
citation! 
(,c)(i) The length of the revocation required by Subsection 
53-3-220(l)(a)(xi), (a)(xii), (b)(i), or (b)(ii) shall be specified in an order of the 
court adjudicating or convicting the person of the offense. 
(ii) If the person adjudicated of the offense is younger than 16 years of 
age, the license or driving privilege shall be revoked for a minimum of one 
year, from age 16, but not to exceed" tlie datethe person turns 21° years of 
age. 
(iii) If the person adjudicated or convicted of the offence'is 16 years of 
age or older, the license or driving privilege' shall be revpked for a 
minimum of one year, but not to exceed five years* 
(d) A revoked license may not be renewed,^ 
(e) Application for a new license shall be filed in accordance with Section 
53-3-205. 
(f) The new license is subject to all provisions ot an original license.' 
(g) The division may
 t not granj the license until an investigation of the 
character, driving abilities, and habits ot the driver has been made to indicate 
whether it is safe to grant him a license. 
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose license to drive a motor vehicle in this 
state has been suspended or revoked under this chapter may not drive a motor 
vehicle in this state under a license, permit, or registration certificate issued by 
any other jurisdiction or other source during suspension or after revocation 
until a new license is obtained under this chapter/ 
§T 5 3 - 3 - 2 2 7 . Driving a motor vehicle prohibited while driving privilege 
denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked—Penalties 
(1) A person whose driving privilege has been denied, suspended, disquali-
fied, or revoked under this chapter or under the laws of the state in which the 
person's driving privilege was granted and who drives any motor vehicle upon 
the highways of this state while that driving privilege is denied, susnended. 
disqualified, or revoked shall be punished as provided in this section. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other than a violation 
specified in Subsection (3) or (4), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(3)(a) A person is guilty of a class Ba misdemeanor it the person's conviction 
under Subsection (1) is based on the person driving a motor vehicle while the 
person's driving privilege is suspended, disqualified, or revoked for: 
*(i) a refusal to submit,to a chemical test under Section 41-6-44.10; 
(ii) a violation of Section ^1,-6-44; 
(iii) a violation of a local ordinance that complies with, the requirements 
of Section 41-6-43; , , , , 
(iv) a, violation of Section 41-6-44.6; ? 
(v) a violation of Section 76-5-207; 
(vi) a criminal action that the person plead guilty to as a result of a plea 
bargain after having been originally charged with violating one or more of 
the sections or ordinances under this Subsection (3); 
(vii) a revocation or suspension which has been extended under Subsec-
tion 53-3-220(2); or 
(viii) where disqualification is the result of driving a commercial motor 
vehicle while the person's CDL is disqualified, suspended, ^canceled, or 
revoked under Subsection 53-3-414(1). , 
(b) A person is guilty or a class B misdemeanor if the person's conviction 
under Subsection (1) is based on the person driving a motor yehicle while the 
person's driving privilege is suspended, disqualified, or revoked by any state, 
the United States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
for violations corresponding to the violations listed in Subsections (3)(a)(i) 
through (vin). 
(c) A fine imposed under this Subsection (3) shall "be at least the maximum 
fine for a class C misdemeanor under Section 76-3-301. 
(4)(a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(i) the person's conviction under Subsection (1) is based on the person 
driving a motor vehicle while the person's driving privilege is suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked for: 
(A) any violations listed in Subsections (3)(a)(i) through (vi); or 
(B) a violation listed in Subsection (3)(a)(vii) if the original revocation 
or suspension was based on any violations listed in Subsections (3)(a)(i) 
through (vi); and 
(ii) the person had any alcohol in the person's body at the time of the 
violation"under Subsection (1). 
(b) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor* iff* 
- (i) the person's conviction under Subsection (l) is based on the person 
driving a motor vehicle while the person's driving privilege is suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked by any state, the United States, or any district, 
possessiofi, or territory rof the United States for violations corresponding to: 
(A) the violations listed in Subsections (3)(a)(i) through (vi); or 
(B) a violation listed in Subsection (3)(a)(vii) if the original revocation 
oj? suspension was ^ased on any violation corresponding to the violations 
listed in Subsections (3)ta)(i) through (vi); and 
(ii) the person had any alcohol in the^person's body at the time of the 
violation under Subsection (1). 
T(c)(i) As part of any sentence imposed for a violation of this SuSsection (4), 
the court shall order: 
(A) a jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours; * 
rB\ a compensatory-service work program for not less than 48 hours; 
or, 
(C) home confinement through the? use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection 41-6-44(13). 
(n) In addition to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c)(i), the court shall 
impose a fine .of not less than $750.-
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
MR. HALLS: I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Step down. 
MR. HALLS: I have no other witnesses. 
MR. SCHULTZ: I have no witnesses. Let me see. Do 
I want to put you on for anything? Do you have anything you'd 
like to testify about? 
MR. YAZZIE: (Inaudible) — I think you covered it. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Yeah, I think we got it covered. 
We rest, Judge. I do have argument. 
THE COURT: Mr. Halls. 
PLAINTIFF !S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
BY MR. HALLS: Your Honor, the, ah — I guess it's 
interesting to know what happened after. I mean the officer 
runs his criminal history and finds out he's got Dial's, a 
couple prior to this. But the issue here is what the officer 
knew. He's testified that he didn't know he had those DUI's, 
prior to the time he pulls him over. 
He knows this person for, ah, 29 years, he said, but 
conservatively, at least 20. Knows where he lives in the 
State of Utah. Has never — has — has personally, ah, 
stopped him or have had occasion to stop him on over 20 
occasions where he has asked for ID, which the best form of 
that the officer testified that they would have been trying to 
get his driver's license ID. And Mr. Yazzie has never been 
able — has never produced it. 
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Ah, the officer said he had never known him to drive 
and never known him to have a driver's license. Sees him 
driving, and the first thing that comes to mind is he doesn't 
have a — he doesn't have a driver's license. I think 
that's — I think you stop a person under that kind of a 
circumstance with the personal knowledge of the individual and 
say, ah, "Clifton, let me see your driver's license," or, you 
know, "Do you have a driver's license?" And, ah, that's 
reasonable. If he — 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) — if, instead, he'd have 
called Dispatch and asked them to run Clifton Yazzie, this 
case would be a no-brainer, wouldn't it? 
MR. HALLS: Well, I guess. Except the circum- — 
yeah. But the circumstance — should — how far should he 
follow him while he does that? Should he follow him two 
miles? 
If that — if that thing sometimes takes three or 
four minutes, he could have been — he could have been a 
quarter of the way to Monticello by that time. And the 
officer, I don't think it's necessarily reasonable to say the 
officer ought to follow him for four or five minutes around 
town while he's waitin' for Dispatch to come back for that. 
And that's not what the ordinary practice would have been. 
I mean we've been through enough of these things. I 
didn't have him testify to that. But the ordinary practice is 
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not that you would — you would call something in while — 
they usually pull the person over, get them off to the side of 
the road and get an identification, and then call in on that 
driver's license. 
THE COURT: Well, sometimes. 
MR. HALLS: Well, that's — it's been my experience 
that that's always pretty much what they do. 
So anyway, we would submit it on that basis. We 
think it's reasonable. 
THE COURT: We shouldn't always err on — err on the 
side of interrupting someone's life, impinging on their 
constitutional rights. We shouldn't always err in that range. 
Mr. Schultz. 
DEFENSE CLOSING ARGUMENT 
BY MR. SCHULTZ: Well, Judge, ah, it sounds to me 
like the Court's pretty well dialed into my arguments. I mean 
it's, ah, we're talking about the constitutional rights of my 
client to be free from unreasonable government intrusion. 
And — and that's exactly what we have here. And the State 
has to show that it' has justification for the intrusion of the 
traffic stop, and I don't think that they've done that. 
This case is distinguishable from Ketron, ah, which 
I know this Court heard, or from other cases where the officer 
knows that this individual has his driver's license that's 
revoked or suspended. 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
PAGE 23 
Ah, this is a situation where the officer simply had 
a belief that, ah — that this individual didn't have a 
driver's license. Not that there was some warrant out for his 
arrest, which may or may not have been true, 
THE COURT: This is someone who had never bothered 
to get a license. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Right. And — and perhaps had the 
officer stopped him, like in the last couple of weeks or the 
last — certainly the day before or certainly five minutes 
before, and found out that Mr., ah, Yazzie didn't have a 
driver's license, then maybe he would have more of a — of an 
articulable reasonable suspicion. 
But you're talking about a one or a two-year period 
with an ind- — for an individual that had, as far as this 
officer was aware at the time, no legal constraints upon his 
ability to go out and obtain a valid Utah driver's license. 
And — and so it's our argument that this intrusion was 
unwarranted and it was unreasonable. And, ah, what we have, 
um, I think fortuitously and not through any arduous skill of 
my own, is — is some information about how — some more 
information about the reasonableness of the stop. 
But I think the Court made in inquiry of that of Mr. 
Halls. And that is is why — you know, would it have been 
possible for the officer to, ah — to have called Dispatch to 
find out, "Does this guy have a driver's license?" Or "Are 
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his driving privileges suspended or revoked in Utah?" 
And the information I'm referring to is simply this. 
And that is if the officer — there was — there was no 
traffic violation. He didn't observe a driving pattern. This 
isn't a situation where the individual was speeding, where he 
was swerving, crossing the fog line, driving up on the 
sidewalk, brushing against the curb, you know, threatening 
other people. 
And in a situation like that, where there's really 
no cause for concern, it's not unreasonable for the officer to 
say — you know, to call Dispatch and say, "Hey, I see Clifton 
Yazzie drivin' out here. I don't think he's got a driver's 
license. What's the situation?" 
Now I think if the officer would have said, "Yeah. 
I had done that. I called in. And gees, while I was callin' 
in, ah, Mr. Yazzie almost hit a lady and a baby carriage 
crossin' Main Street there," ah, I don't think I'd have that 
good an argument. 
But in this situation where the last — where this 
officer said he never had any knowledge of the fact that Mr. 
Yazzie had a — ah, a driver's license — excuse me — his 
driving privileges were suspended or revoked, wasn't aware of 
any legal hindrance from Mr. Yazzie having a driver's license, 
that it was a minimum of at least a year before he had any 
reason or opportunity to check, ah, Mr. Yazzie's driving 
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status, ah, I think that just simply stopping someone because 
you donft think he!s — because the last time you knew, a year 
ago, he didn!t have a driving privilege, is unreasonable. It 
isn't warranted, and I think itTs a violation. And, ah, we're 
asking the Court for us to stop and the fruit of the poisonous 
tree that flows therefrom. 
I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Fruit flows from a tree? 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
BY MR. HALLS: Can I respond to that briefly, Your 
Honor? 
I suppose that it does make some difference here. 
Well, the alcohol inquiry does make some difference, because 
when you know that a person has this kind of a history of 
alcohol, I think the officer has a suspicion in his mind not 
only does he not have a license, but there are some good 
reasons why he probably doesn't have a license. 
It turns out that after they do this, he has a DUI 
in 1995 and one in 2001. 
THE COURT: So could — if we have a town drunk, we 
can always stop the town drunk whenever he's driving, just on 
the presumption that must be drunk? 
MR. HALLS: If you have a town drunk, Your Honor, 
that has never had a driver's license in 29 years, and you 
know that he has driven several times — well, I — I'm gonna 
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back off of that. But you know the person has had lots of 
alcohol offenses and hefs apparently driven before. He has 
some DUI's, but you donft discover that until later. The 
question is not whether or not there are other reasonable 
alternatives. 
What Mr. — what the Court said is "Wouldn't it have 
been reasonable for them to just call this in?" Well, yeah. 
It might have been. 
There are some other things that might have been 
reasonable, but the question is whether or not it is 
unreasonable to turn around and pull this person over very 
briefly and say, "Show me your license." That's not 
unreasonable. And that's the issue. Not whether there could 
have been something else done. But is that unreasonable? 
THE COURT 
MR. HALLS 
You're right. You're right, 
It isn't. 
THE COURT: It does occasionally get mentioned 
though, in judicial opinions, that there was another way to do 
this that would have been a lot easier. But it is true that I 
have to evaluate it the way it is and simply make a 
determination whether it's A or B, and not worry about C. 
MR. HALLS 
THE COURT 
MR. HALLS 
Well, — 
You're right. 
— I — I guess that's — I mean it's 
not a hard — it's not a hard factual case. I think the Court 
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has it all laid out for it. And our position is it was not 
unreasonable, based upon what the officer knew, to stop Mr. 
Yazzie to determine whether he actually did have a license or 
not, 
COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Well, the reason why I wished the officer had 
checked, ah, or watched, until he committed a traffic 
violation, as he probably would have, is that, ah, I'm gonna 
deny the motion to suppress. But I think it could be 
appealed, and I'd just as soon not have this added to my 
roster of reversals, Court Of Appeals. Because I think 
there's an issue here. It!s not a no-brainer. It could have 
been one, and it isn!t. 
Ah, the reason that I think that it was reasonable 
for the officer to stop is that it was such a long time that 
the defendant had never had a license. I think it's 
reasonable to — to believe he still doesn't have one, and 
he's driving now. 
But there's a fairly strong argument the other way. 
You know, maybe he decided to go get a license, before he 
started drivin'. And in fact, he did. In this case it turned 
out he did. He got it from the wrong agency. It didn't do 
him any good. It was both wrong, because he wasn't a resident 
of Arizona, and because his license was -- and even if it was 
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a valid Arizona license, it was useless in Utah, because his 
privilege to drive in Utah was suspended. But he had — he 
had apparently decided he wanted^to try to get a license. 
But I think it was reasonable for the officer to 
suspect that he did not have a license, that he was driving 
based on that long history and the frequent contact. 
This is an unusual case. I wouldn't ordinarily 
permit an officer to stop someone just because once before, 
somebody didn't have a license. But because of the number of 
times and the extended period of time, I think it was 
reasonable for just him just to assume that yeah, he still 
didn't have a license. So I'm denying the motion to suppress. 
Now we are going to trial next, ah — 
MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, I want to find out. And I 
think I'm gonna do that in open court, if the Court can spare, 
ah — spare some time and some patience with me. 
I've — I've gone back and forth with Mr. Yazzie on 
this and I'm not exactly sure what his, ah, undecisiveness is. 
And part of it may be just cause there's some confusion on his 
head in his mind. 
But, ah, the last time I spoke with him, ah, Mr. 
Yazzie, ah, we talked about the fact that if you lost this 
hearing today, that you could plead guilty, but still preserve 
your right to, ah, appeal the Judge's denial of your 
suppression motion; is that correct? 
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